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The condition of small-scale farmers in Indonesia is getting worse that is caused by an unfair low 
price that reflects to the low level of revenue for their income. This happens either because the 
dependency on trader/middlemen for selling the produce and the low accessibility of farmers to 
the market. The existence of auction mechanisms created by the Indonesian government auctions 
is still dominated by traders/middlemen, so that the increasing of prices have not affected to the 
farmers. Alternatively, by linking directly farmers to the auction mechanism will be analyzed in a 
descriptive and a qualitative ways from the point of view of price formation in the auction and the 
farmers’  determining  factors  to  participate  in  the  auction.  The  analysis  conducts  policy 
recommendations for ongoing agricultural auction development with the direct participation of 
small-scale farmers in the mechanism. 
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1.  Introduction 
Data from Indonesian Census of Agriculture BPS in 2003 indicates that the number of 
Indonesia small-scale farmers (petani gurem) was increasing 2.4 % per year, with 10.8 
million in 1993 to 13.7 million in 2003.  With have a very small landholding, less than 0.5 
Ha, they only cannot increase their welfare. This condition is become worst when they get 
low income which is leaded by low prices for their product. Factors that may put small-
scale  farmers,  on  this  situation  include:  increasing  difficulties  for  market  access  and 
dependency of famers on traders or middlemen for selling their product. Also, the structure 
market of the agricultural products in the village level have problems facing the weak 
bargaining  position  of  farmers,  which  always  low  in  price  level,  low  quality  and 
distribution chain length, so the damaged goods quickly so that the accumulation of waste. 
In most case, market price establishment is determined by the direct negotiation between 
individual  farmers  and  individual traders and often puts  farmers on the weak position 
because of the limited information owned.  
 
Therefore, the Indonesian government is now giving effort to rearrange the agricultural 
market facilities by establishes Sub-Terminal Agribusiness in all off province, with the 
auction mechanism. Formally, this institution market facilitates a direct trading between 
farmers, as a seller, and buyers to create a transparent pricing mechanism, marketing point 
cut, boost quality and production, and improving farmers’ bargaining position that in turn 
can increase income of farmers. Thus, the auction mechanism can set the good price for 
the commodities. But in fact, the auction is dominated by traders, the middlemen and again 
they are the ones earning a good price and a good profit margin, while the farmers struggle 
with their farm-gate prices. 
 
Giving farmers direct entry to the auction market will put farmers in direct contact with 
buyers and put them in a stronger bargaining position. But on the other hand, the cost of 
participating in the market gives the other question, whether the farmers earn higher profit 
margin than if they sell their commodities on the farm gate, even they could receive a 
higher prices.  
Auction  performance  and  the  direct  participation  of  small-scale  farmers,  into  the 
mechanism  will  be  analyzed  from  the  price  formation’s  point  of  view  and  farmer’s 
incentive.  The  descriptive  and  qualitative  analysis  will  allow  us  to  conduct  policy   2 
recommendations  for ongoing development of efficient agricultural auction  mechanism 
and the farmer’s direct participation to the auction mechanism. 
 
2.  Market Mechanism and price formation 
2.1. Study area 
The study concentrated in the Central Java province and we concentrated the study on 
the vegetables  farm production  location at Karanganyar district, specifically  in the 
village of Tawangmangu on hilly plateau Lawu Mountain. Vegetables commodities 
are sold on many markets in the province. In this area there is one main market as the 
place where the commodities are mostly traded. To obtain the data for this study, the 
survey focused on farmer respondents in the around of the village main market within 
15 kilometers radius.    
The  auction  mechanism  which  was  used  in  the  study  is  Soropadan  Agro-Auction 
market in the province of Central Java, which is located about 125 kilometers from 
Tawamangu and it began operations in October 2003. The transaction is held by a 
mechanism;  buyers  hold  open  bidding,  the  price  is  the  highest  bidding  as  price 
realization transaction. Institutions who developed this market are the Department of 
Industry and Trade of Central Java Province, the Department of agriculture and local 
government of Central Java province.  
 
2.2. Vegetables Marketing channel  
As  analyzed  by  Shepherd  and  Schalke  (1995),  Indonesian  marketing  channel  for 
vegetables vary by commodity and province, but the most common marketing’s model 
occurring are:  
a.  Farmers go to the local assembly market, either with their own or a rented vehicle, 
where they sell to traders who supply wholesale markets; 
b.  Traders buy the field ( standing crop purchase) and deliver to wholesale market; 
c.  Traders collect from  farmers at or close to farm gate and deliver to wholesale 
markets; 
d.  Field traders collect from farmers and sell to the retail market or to traders for 
delivery to wholesale markets, and; 
e.  Farmer sells, either through an agent directly, to a packing house which prepares 
shipments to buyers, supermarket or export.   3 
In the case of small-scale farmer in the Central Java province, the model (e) is rarely 
occurred.  Having  specified  the  commonly  model  of  the  vegetables  marketing  in 
Indonesia, this study now introduce other alternative model to sell the vegetables, that 
is Agro-auction market which the Indonesian government has developed.  
 
2.3. Auction Market 
Implementation of the Agro-auction market is generally once every 2 months; with the 
level of diversity of products those are very diverse. According to the index data, there 
are 792 commodities items which traded on this market. But not all products are sold 
in each auction. Based on the market implementation data from 2005 to 2008, every 
year has the different trend of the commodity that was traded in. On 2005’s auction 
section, Cereals became most traded commodity in while this year, with the average 
percentage in each auction was 44.6 % of the total average transaction per auction and 
dominated by rice’s transaction. Central Java is the second biggest province producer 
of  rice  in  Indonesia,  and  on  several  region,  rice  still  became  the  most  wanted 
commodity, that’s make it taken the most interest commodity to traded on this market. 
For 2006’s auction series, trend of the commodity that was traded in changed. There 
was  in  average  40.4  %  of  the  total  average  transaction  that  traded  for  sugar 
commodity.  Cereals  commodities  have  been  dominated  again  during  2007  -  2008 
auction season.  
The types of commodities that were traded can be grouped into 6 kind product of 
agricultural field, to get a diversity tendency of commodity. Trend of the percentage of 
the commodities per year traded, give a tendency for commodities diversity during 
auction has been held.  From the trend in figure 1 can be seen that transactions were 
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Percentage of Auctioned Commodities
food corps 60.18% 12.27% 26.88% 20.62%
Horticultural corps 23.54% 9.41% 24.39% 13.42%
Plantation corps 5.67% 64.16% 38.63% 20.79%
Livestock 0.48% 7.09% 7.15% 21.63%
Fisheries 6.32% 0.28% 0.66% 0.31%
Other commodities 3.81% 6.78% 2.29% 23.23%
2005 2006 2007 2008
 
This  shows  an  indication  that  the  auction  market  has  been  reaching  each  fields  of 
agriculture‘s market.  
Since  the  study  was  concentrated  in  the  vegetable  market,  then  the  analysis  was 
emphasized on vegetables commodities. As the second commodities traded in the auction, 
the  historical transactions data presented on the Figure 2 shows the percentage of the 
vegetables traded in the auction during 2005 – 2008: 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of vegetables transaction 
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As red chili is an important food ingredient for Indonesian, thus the graph shows us how 
red  chili  gives  the  greatest  percentage  to  the  total  auction  transaction  of  vegetables 
commodities. 
 
Membership of this market was dominated by farmers’ association, main market traders 
‘cooperative in Java and individuals trading company. But such increases in the number of 
members  who  participate  didn’t  have  a  significantly  effect  on  the  total  of  auction 
transactions. It can be seen from figure 3, although the number of participants increased, 
the total transaction tends to decrease. This indicates that the decrease of trade transactions 
for  some  of  commodities  which  have  most  contribution  to  the  total  transaction.  This 
tendency can also be caused by some traders who switch on others commodities that are 
considered potential, even though the commodity was a new entry in the market. Even 
then, some of traders were come to discover some new commodities. It is commonly for 
products derived from primary commodities.  
 


















3.  Data and variable 
 
The  case  study  presented  here  is  focused  on  determining  the  major  factors  which  are 
probably influence a farmer of making a decision to participate in the auction. First, we 
identity and analyze two different price determination, in the market and auction. Second, 
we  obtained  the  market  prices  data  and  closing  prices  at  the  auction  to  describe  the 
evidence from price comparisons. By doing so, we identify the final price under which 
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determination. The prices data on both mechanisms are secondary data which are collected 
during 2005 – 2008. Using the evidence on the second step; we provide a-priori hypothesis 
and develop a set of questionnaire instrument to assess farmer’s incentive to participate in 
the auction. Third, we summarize the results of the earlier analysis that compares the price 
of vegetables sold through the market and auction mechanism.  
Onion  and red chili  have  been chosen as the commodities  are studied, as  both of the 
commodities are represented the different characteristic of vegetables commodities, on the 
point  of  view  perishable  level  and  market  price  dynamics.  Hence,  the  comparison’s 
evidence would be obtained.  
The auction price determination was analyzed by the data of the winning bids (auction’s 
closing price); the reservation price and the market price are measured in Rupiah/kg. The 
quantity is measured in tons. The qualitative variables which defined as the date when the 
auction is held correspond to crops season of the commodity. The data variables for two 
commodities are summarized in the following table 
 




         
Variables  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Bid  10954.69  7060.937  26000  2250 
Reservation Price  11634.38  6726.062  26000  2250 
Market Price  8341.84  2446.549  13611  3375 





         
Variables  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Bid  5106.67  1246.977  8000  3100 
Reservation Price  5706.67  1486,831  8000  3100 
Market Price  8420,93  1789,888  10167  4889 
Quantity  370,67  512,786  1500  30 
 
The objectives of the implementation of this auction market is the place for the establishment of 
a transparent price and to increase price in the level of producers, with the indicator that is the   7 
difference between the prices formed in the auction market with market prices become closer. 
The comparison between the selling price and market price can be seen in figure 4. 
 






















The data set was used to provide the simplest approach of the auction empirical analysis  by 
estimating the observed closing price, as the highest bid  ) ( l b  among all the bids of the buyers for 
each auction ) (l . The empirical analysis begins by assuming that the observed price, depends on 
these following characteristics ( ) l Z : 
a.  Commodities Characteristic 
1 , l Z = Reservation price 
2 , l Z = Market price reference 
3 , l Z = Quantity of offered commodities 
b.  Market Characteristic 
4 , l Z = Crop seasons, is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the auction on the 
harvest season, 0 otherwise.  
We assume that the bid ) ( l b  is a linear function of four kinds of variables above: ) ( l l Z b Φ = . So 
the function linear  ) (Φ  can be written: 
4 , 4 3 , 3 2 , 2 1 , 1 0 l l l l l Z Z Z Z b β β β β β + + + + =                         (1) 
Assuming  that  the  closing  price  is  a  random  variable  and  has  a  normal 
distribution )) ( ), ( ( l l b b E N σ , the ordinary least squares method is used to estimate the expectation 
)
~
(b E  from the statistical model u Z Z Z Z b l l l l l
~ ~
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From the figure 3 can also be seen that Red Chili has the market price volatility more dynamics 
than onion. Thus it is assumed that red chili’s paper might be more affected by the factors of 
harvest season. Therefore we estimate red chili by considering the harvest season while onion is 
estimated without harvest season’s variable as the independent variable. Hence, the model linear 
for onion is presented as follows 
ɶ
0 1 ,1 2 ,2 3 ,3 O o o o l l l l b Z Z Z u β β β β = + + + +                    (2) 
Then, each commodity is estimated using three models: the model 1, with all the all exogenous 
variables, then the model 2 with only the reservation price and the model 3 without the reservation 
price, we obtained the results in table 3. 
 
The  probability  of  whether  farmer  will  decide  to  participate  in  the  auction  was  analyzed  by 
logistic regression. According Gujarati (1988), logistic regression, is used to predict a categorical 
(usual dichotomous) variable from set of predictors or explanatory variables. The predictors are 
mix  of  continuous  and  categorical  variables.  Then  the  technique  was  employed  for  the  data 
collected by randomly survey for the small-scale producers, as respondent, in the study area. A set 
of structured question was designed to collect the information about the factors which determined 
the  decision  to  participate  in  the  auction.  Hence,  the  following  information  was  utilized  and 
hypothesized as the factors included in the empirical model the decision: 
1.  Characteristic of the farmer regarding gender, age, education. The data collected indicates a 90 
percent of the small-scale farmers not go beyond the level education at elementary school. 
Thus,  we  assumed  that  the  farmers  in  the  same  perception  about  the  knowledge  market. 
Hence,  the  age  and  education  variables  were  not  included  in  the  model  and  the  gender 
variable was determined as the only characteristic variable included in the model. 
2.  Access to Income such as landholding, scale of production and the commodities characteristic. 
We  hypothesized a positive relationship  between  landholding, scale of production and the 
decision.  The  larger  of  landholding’s  number  and  scale  of  production  reflect  the  level  of 
capitalization that lead their orientation on the searching of the better market demand, as to 
allocate  the  commodities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  commodities  characteristics,  as 
perishability’s level and seasonal factor, are negatively associated with the decision. Since 
vegetable is the commodity with the very low of the perishability level, the farmer is likely to 
find the buyer as rapid as possible to reduce the risk of loss their income opportunity. This 
evidence has confirmed by 95 percent of the farmers sold their commodities to the buyers who 
come to the farm gate.    9 
3.  Access to market was observed in terms contact with the specific buyer and the cooperatives 
membership. Many of the farmers sell their commodities to the traders who come to the farm; 
thus, it is more profitable for the farmer, as they could distribute as soon as the commodities 
harvested and reduce the transportation cost. Hence, the data shows majority the farmers have 
the contacts with the traders that assumed be negatively relationships with the decision. Mean 
while,  the  cooperatives  membership  facilitate  the  access  to  the  auction,  as  the  auction 
mechanism is provided by empowering the cooperatives role among the farmers. 
By using logistic regression model will be predicting the logit, that is, the natural log of the ‘odds’ 















= = + +   −   ∑ ,                        (3) 
Where: 
•  P is the predicted probability of the event which is coded with 1 (decide to participate in 
the auction) rather than with 0 (not to participate); 







  −  
 is “odd” as the ratio of the probability of an event's occurring to the probability 








  −  
 is the logarithm of  “odds”; 
•  X is explanatory variables; 
•  0 β   is the coefficient of the  constant term and  n β is the coefficient of the explanatory 
variables; 
•  m is the response category,  
•  n denotes cases (1,2,3,..., ) i  
•  n u  is unobserved random effects 















= + +   −   ∑                             (4) 
Thus,  by  equation  (3)  the  probability  that  the  farmer  decide  to  participate  in  the  auction  is 
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Considering to the study, we use the subjects’ decision as the dichotomous criterion variable, with 
“1” when the  farmer decides probably to participate and “0” when the  farmer decides not to 
participate  in  the  auction.  Then,  the  explanatory  variables  divided  into  two  kind  of  criterion 
variable: 
•  Categorical variables : gender (gen; with 0 = female, 1 = Male), trader contact ( tc; with 0 
= no contact, 1 = have contact), Cooperatives Membership (cm; with 0 = not member, 1 = 
member); 
•  Continuous variables: education (edu; scale 1 – 5), landholding (land; scale 1 – 5), Scale 
of production (sp; scale 1 – 4), Commodities characteristic (cc; scale 1 – 4). 
 
Hence, the following logistic regression model was used for the study: 
0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ln( ) ln
1
n
gen n tc n cm n edu n land n sp n cc n
n
P
ODDS X X X X X X X u
P
β β β β β β β β
 
= = + + + + + + + +   −  
 
By the data observed, the effect of dependent variables on percentage of decision to participate in 
the auction, with the total percentage of the decision to participate is only 31.4 % compares 68.8 
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Table 2. Explanatory variables of farmer’s decision 
Decision (Percentage) 
Variable 
Yes  No 
Gender     
Female  22,2%  77,8% 
Male  41,2%  58,8% 
Trader contact     
Yes  37,9%  62,1% 
No  5,0%  95,0% 
Cooperatives member     
Yes  33,3%  66,7% 
No  30,8%  69,2% 
Education     
< Elementary School  40,0%  60,0% 
Elementary School  16,7%  83,3% 
Junior high School  28,6%  71,4% 
Senior high School   -   - 
University  99,0%  1,0% 
Landholding     
< 1000 m²  35,0%  63,0% 
1000 m² - 2500 m²  25,0%  75,0% 
2500 m² - 0.5 Ha  42,9%  57,1% 
0.5 Ha - 1 Ha  2,0%  98,0% 
> 1 Ha   2,3%  97,7% 
Scale of production     
1-5 quintals  35,0%  65,0% 
6 quintal - 1 ton  40,0%  60,0% 
1 - 5 ton  14,3%  85,7% 
> 5 ton  33,3%  66,7% 
Commodity Characteristic     
< 1 week  38,5%  61,5% 
1 week - 1 month  1,0%  99,0% 
> 1 month  14,3%  85,7% 
 
4.  Results 
Estimation results on the auction prices determination for two commodities are presented in 
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Table 3. Estimation result 
Red Chili  
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  -4896.38  -904.07  - 2200.36 
Reservation price  0.985  1.019  1.014 
Market price   0.380  0  0.913 
Quantity  -0.118  0  0.162 
Crops season       - 0.19  0  0 
Adjusted R Square  0.959  0.943  0.946 
 
Onion 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  746.38  1500.17  615.97 
Reservation price  0.373  0.632  0 
Market price   0.292  0  0.571 
Quantity  0.600  0  - 0.853 
Adjusted R Square  0.627  0.568  0.568 
 
The result indicated that the auction’s closing price is explained by a linear regression on the 
variables ) 0 , , , ( 4 3 2 1 ≠ β β β β . On the red chili case, the negative constant on three models indicate 
that when auction is held without four independent variables, the price will be -4896.38, -904.07 
and  - 2200.36 standard deviation below the mean of their closing price. The quantity and Crops 
season coefficient are also negative. Although for the quantity coefficient is not significant. It 
might be explained that the final buyers buy on several offer in the auction, they buy in regarding 
the interesting price which is offered. So, quantities offered in this market do not affect their 
willingness to pay. On the other hand, the negative quantity coefficient is significantly affected to 
the onion’s closing price; it means there was an indication that the buyer will reduce their bid as 
well as the increasing onion’s quantity offered. Price determination’s behavior is different for two 
commodities. For the red chili closing price was significantly determined by reservation price 
posted before the auction while the onion price was more affected by the quantity offered by the 
seller. The different determining factor might be characterized by market price dynamics of the 
commodities, as presented on Figure 4. Since the market price of onion is more stable than red 
chili, thus there is no price speculation from either the seller or the buyer and the negotiation 
process,  presented  by  bidding  process,  was  occurred  by  quantity  offered.  The  seasonal   13 
characteristic  of  the  red  chili  was  leaded  to  instability  on  the  market  price.  Hence,  once  the 
auction was held both of the seller and the buyer consider the actual market price. The level of 
perishability of the commodities was likely affecting the determination of the prices, as onion is 
more storable than red chili. 
 The evidence from the auction price determination would be confirmed concerning the farmer’s 
motivation to participate in the auction. The logistic regression coefficient, and odds ratio for each 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 4. 
       Table 4. Logistic regression predicting the farmer’s decision  
Variable  Coefficient  Partial  effect 
Gender     
Model 1  1.762  5.824 
Model 2  0.904  2.470 
Model 3  0  0 
Education     
Model 1   - 0.530  0.589 
Model 2   - 0.036  0.964 
Model 3  0  0 
Landholding     
Model 1   - 0.525  0.592 
Model 2   - 0.241  0.786 
Model 3  0  0 
Production Scale     
Model 1   - 0.532  0.587 
Model 2  0  0 
Model 3   - 0.407  0.666 
Traders Connection     
Model 1  22.142  0.000000004 
Model 2  0  0 
Model 3  0  0 
Commodities Characteristic     
Model 1   - 0.746  0.474 
Model 2  0  0 
Model 3    - 0.926  0.396 
Cooperatives Membership     
Model 1  1.323  3.754 
Model 2   - 0.281  0.755 
Model 3  0  0 
 
The logistic models were constructed by an iterative maximum likelihood produce for three 
models different and the value of coefficients indicates the change in the predicted logged 
odds associated with a unit change in explanatory variables.  
The model 1 was constructed with seven all explanatory variables that were hypothesized 
before as the determining factors of the farmers decision. The results show that education 
level,  landholding,  production  scale  and  commodities  characteristic  variables  give  the   14 
statistically similar significances value while trader connection as the higher significant value 
explaining the model. Thus, it can be interpreted that the farmer’s decision to participate in the 
auction is characterized by the farmer’s connection to trader. Further, it can be explained by 
the actual selling mechanism occurring which most of the farmer sells their commodities to 
the traders who come directly to farm gate though provided in reducing transport cost. This 
evidence has confirmed also in others models constructed model 2 and model 3, without trader 
connection  variable  included  in  the  models.  Both  of  the  models  give  the  insignificant 
coefficient for all the variables.  
The  partial  effect  coefficient  of  the  continuous  variables  can  suggested  us  the  effect  of 
increment  of  the  level  in  the  respective  variable  on  the  probability  farmer  decides  to 
participate in the auction. Results of the three models show positively partial effect in the all 
variables employed. It indicates that the increasing in one unit level of variables leads to the 
increasing probability of the farmer’s decision to participate in the auction as well. In more 
detail, regarding to the model 1 which show us that the one unit increment of education level 
affects on the improving of participation decision. It is also found that the increasing of the 
landholding and production scale were the factors to improve the farmer’s motivation enter 
into  the  auction.  And  also,  more  storable  of  one  commodity  could  encourage  farmers  to 
participate. 
In the absence of production scale and commodities characteristic variables, as in model 2, the 
increasing of level of the education have more highly effect to the decision as the landholding 
number  increase  as  well.  Also,  the  model  3  suggests  that  improving  in  the  one  unit  of 
production scale could improve as well the farmer’s decision.  
 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
Considering  the  estimation  results  of  the  auction’s  price  determination  and  the  logistic 
regression analysis for the model of probability the farmer’s decision to participate in the 
auction, suggest us the determining factors whether the small-scale farmer’s participation in 
the auction is effective. From the point of view of the price determination in the auction, the 
different  commodities  characteristic  were  yielded  the  different  significant  on  determining 
factor. The lower perishability commodities have dynamically market price, thus the auction 
price was determined by the reservation price that posted at the beginning of the auction. 
Hence, the farmer has to set the appropriate reservation price in order to obtain the optimal 
auction price. That appropriate reservation price should  be set regarding the  market price 
reference to avoid inefficiency in choosing the better market place for selling the commodity.   15 
But, unlike in red chili case, the market price of the commodity with high perishability is more 
stable, though the quantity offered  in the auction  is the  main determining  factor which  is 
considered by the auction participants in defining the price.  
Regarding the price determining factors in the auction, the logistic model of farmer’s decision 
give the analysis about the efficiency on farmer’s participation. Based on the data observed in 
the study area which represented vegetables farmers in the province, 71.4 % of respondents 
cultivate  the  variant  of  vegetables  with  the  less  than  1  week  long-life  and  among  these 
respondents there were only 38.5 % decided to participate. As the farmer’s decision model is 
significantly explained by the trader connection’s factor and 83 % of the respondents sell their 
commodity to the traders who come to them, though the small percentage of farmers who has 
the decision to participate might be generated by the lack of information on actual market 
price. Obviously, it can be only understood the reason why the farmer would not to speculate 
for selling their commodity in the mechanism which they do not know yet, as almost all of 
them did not get information about the auction.  
 
The next question is whether the farmers earn higher income than if they sell the commodity 
on  the  farm  gate,  even  they  receive  a  higher  prices  in  the  auction.  In  fact,  the  only 
consideration  of  farmer  for  selling  the  commodity  to  traders  is  there  is  no  additional 
transaction cost incurring, because the traders pick the commodities directly to the farm gate. 
Since  the  most  of  vegetables’  farmer  are  low  on  the  scale  of  production,  reducing  in 
transaction cost was driving their decision where they would to sell their commodity. On the 
other hand, the profitable revenues might be obtained if they could collect their commodities 
with the others; therefore the transaction is shared among them. Formally, this collection action 
should be taken and organized by cooperative, but, in contrast, only 25 percent of the farmers 
to be member of the village cooperatives. Since, the only one reason of farmer being a member 
is  to  get  easily  the  supply  of  fertilizer.  Hence,  the  marketing  commodities  role  of  the 
cooperatives has not played well. 
Finally,  small-farmers  will  only  participate  in  the  mechanism  in  which  it  doesn’t  incur 
additional transaction cost, such as transportation cost. Alternatively, the cost can be reduced 
by  empowering  the  collective  action,  in  this  case  cooperative  should  be  re-taking  their 
important role, as commodities marketing agent, because the fact shows the better prices in the 
auction. By doing so, the farmer have the opportunity to access to the auction and getting 
better  income.  The  suggestion  made  in  this  study  as  the  preliminary  result  to  extent  our   16 
analysis of price determination in the auction which is wish useful for developing the policy 
recommendations in Agricultural Market of Central Java Province.  
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